We investigate the role of analyst/investor days as a distinct disclosure medium and in conjunction with conference presentations. We find that analyst/investor days are less frequent but have six times larger price impact than conferences presentations. We find 25% of firms hosting analyst/investor days in a year do not participate at broker conferences, consistent with firms responding to analyst lack of interest in organizing investor interactions. The remaining 75% operate more segments and engage in more R&D and M&A activities than firms that only make conference presentations, consistent with analyst/investor days offering unique disclosure benefits. Moreover, the occurrence of an analyst/investor day prior to a conference presentation erodes the presentation's price impact but not vice versa, consistent with firms favoring analyst/investor days as a disclosure medium.
Introduction
Analyst/investor days are a distinct disclosure medium that allows management to engage in face-to-face interactions with select capital market participants. Academic researchers have overlooked this medium, focusing primarily on conference presentations.
1 This research gap is unfortunate as there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that analyst/investor days are a major disclosure and investor relations (IR) activity (Rossi [2010] ; Buckley [2012] ), and an indispensable information gathering activity from the sell-side and buy-side analyst perspective (Valentine [2011] ). Further, understanding the determinants and consequences of analyst/investor days is not a simple matter of extrapolating results from studies on conference participation. For instance, firms may organize analyst/investor days because they lack opportunities for face-to-face interactions at investor conferences or because these interactions are an incomplete solution to their disclosure needs. Discriminating between these two hypotheses is critical to understanding the unique role of analyst/investor days as a disclosure medium. In this study, we introduce analyst/investor days, and we examine their role as a disclosure medium by addressing several basic questions: What determines the choice to host analyst/investor days? How informative are analyst/investor days? Are there interdependencies in the choice and consequences of analyst/investor days and conference presentations?
Our sample includes 2,190 analyst/investor days hosted by 1,116 firms from 2004 to 2011. The number of firms hosting analyst/investor days increases from less than 200 in the first two years of the sample period to more than 300 in the last two years. Thus, a growing and economically significant number of companies host analyst/investor days. In contrast to broker-hosted conferences, firms bear the cost of planning and organizing an analyst/investor day, which gives managers greater control over key aspects of their interactions with investors including the invitation list, venue, and timing. Analyst/investor days generally have longer duration, more flexible format, and a wider range of presenters including company insiders and in some cases customers and suppliers. As a result, we expect that analyst/investor days will facilitate the disclosure of new information and that this medium will be better suited to satisfying the disclosure needs of firms with high valuation uncertainty and complexity, as well as firms with a larger institutional investor base. Alternatively, it is possible that firms use analyst/investor days primarily as vehicle for building and maintaining relationships with the analyst and investor communities, rehashing old disclosures and engaging in corporate puffery.
We find that analyst/investor days convey substantial new information to the market.
Three-day abnormal absolute return and three-day abnormal share turnover increase by about 34% and 29% from the estimation period [-120,-30] . Analyst/investor days have an even greater effect on analyst revision activity. The number of forecasts issued in a three-day interval increases 141% from the estimation period. More importantly, analyzing a sample of firms that hosted analyst/investor days and made conference presentations in the same year, we find that the effect of analyst/investor days on three-day abnormal absolute returns and turnover is approximately three to six times larger than the effect of conference presentations, and that only analyst/investors days have a positive effect on three-day abnormal analyst forecast activity.
We find that 75% of the firms that host an analyst/investor day in a given year also participate at broker conferences, suggesting lack of opportunities to engage in face-to-face interactions with investors and analysts is only a partial explanation for why firms host analyst/investor days. In particular, within the subset of conference presentation firms that are the focus of prior literature, we find firms that both host an analyst/investor day and make conference presentations differ systematically from firms that only make conference presentations. The firms that choose both are bigger, younger, more likely to have professional IR, have higher analyst and institutional following, operate more segments, and engage in more R&D and M&A activities. This finding is consistent with that notion that analyst/investor days offer a fundamentally different cost-benefit trade-off from broker conferences. Specifically, the long duration of an analyst/investor day, the flexible format, and the involvement of a wide range of company insiders offer unique disclosure benefits to firms and allow hosts to expand upon complex topics and provide soft information in a way that a conference presentation does not allow.
A large percentage of firms hosting analyst/investor days and making conference presentations over the same year raises questions about potential interaction effects in the timing choice and information content of these events. We suggest that these events are more likely to take place in the same fiscal quarter if the role of analyst/investor days is to supplement and elaborate on conference disclosures; or in opposite quarters if both these disclosure media are valuable information channels that compete for the time and attention of senior management and internal IR professionals. We find strong evidence that analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to occur in different quarters. The probability of hosting an analyst/investor day in a given quarter is reduced by 22% when a firm makes at least one conference presentation during the current quarter.
Lastly, we investigate whether the information content of a conference presentation (analyst/investor day) depends on whether it occurs in proximity to an analyst/investor day (conference presentation). We find that the occurrence of an analyst/investor day prior to a conference presentation erodes the presentation's effect on abnormal absolute return, but that the occurrence of a conference presentation before or after an analyst/investor day does not diminish the information content of analyst/investor days. The asymmetric findings are consistent with firms favoring analyst/investor days over conference presentations as a disclosure channel when analyst/investor days and conference presentations occur in proximity.
Our study has implications for both academics and practitioners. We contribute to the limited knowledge of face-to-face interactions within the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence on the use and information content of a new disclosure medium. We answer calls to consider interdependencies in various information sources (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther [2010, p.298] ) by investigating how the most closely related medium, conference presentations, compares to and interacts with analyst/investor days. Specifically, our findings suggest that analyst/investor days are a medium used by firms that lack opportunities to interact with investors, and by firms that have such opportunities but whose complex and diverse activities make the short duration and rigid format of a conference presentation a partial and imperfect solution to these firms' information problems. Our findings that analyst/investor days are less frequent than conference presentations but have greater impact on abnormal absolute return, turnover, and analyst forecast activity establish analyst/investor days as a distinct and important market source of information. This evidence can be useful to managers in search of an effective communications strategy and to investors focused on optimizing their information gathering activities. Our finding that analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to take place in opposite quarters underscores how the scarcity of a limited resource, such as the time and attention of senior management, constrains disclosure choices focused on corporate access.
Finally, our study adds to the nascent investor relations literature which documents positive capital market outcomes from engaging in comprehensive external or internal IR strategies (Bushee and Miller [2012] , Kirk and Vincent [2014] ). Our result that firms with an internal IR investment are more likely to participate in conferences and host analyst/investor days highlights the coordinating role of IR professionals in facilitating interactions with capital market participants.
Background
Broadly, disclosure channels either aim to deliver a message to a wide audience, allowing no or limited interaction (e.g., financial reports, regulatory filings, press releases, conference calls), or aim to allow opportunities for formal and informal face-to-face interactions with a small audience of influential market participants (e.g., investor conferences, site visits, and analyst/investor days). (Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] , Miller [2013, Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi [2014a] , Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi [2014b] ). The combined evidence suggests that broker-hosted conferences are an equilibrium multi-party arrangement that facilitates the flow of information from management to investors when valuation difficulty is high, benefitting all parties involved: investors, firms, brokers, and analysts.
Data limitations have prevented researchers from studying analyst/investor days despite anecdotal evidence suggesting that analyst/investor days are a major disclosure and IR activity (Rossi [2010] , Buckley [2012] ) and an indispensable information gathering activity for sell-side and buy-side analysts (Valentine [2011] ). Since little is known about analyst/investor days, we begin by discussing their institutional attributes and how they differ from conference presentations, a related and well-researched disclosure medium. We then derive insights into the role of analyst/investor days as a disclosure medium and potential interdependencies in the use and information content of analyst/investor days versus conference presentations.
In contrast with conference presentations, the firm controls all aspects of an analyst/investor day such as the timing, the duration, the format, as well as the invitees' and the presenters' lists. The increased control for the firm as well as the longer duration and the involvement of a large number of insiders and outsiders imply increased cost and organizational burden for the firm. Analyst/investor days therefore happen less frequently than conference calls and broker-hosted conferences. The greatest frequency for surveyed NIRI firms was once a year (49%), another large segment (35%) hosted less than once a year, and 12% reported ad-hoc scheduling (NIRI [2011] ). Most firms begin planning the meeting about six months in advance primarily to avoid scheduling conflicts as the major work takes place about six to eight weeks before the analyst/investor day.
Firms send out on average 100-500 exclusive invitations mainly to analysts and institutional investors: 98% of NIRI respondents invite current sell-side analysts, 70% invite prospective sell-side analysts, 98% invite current institutional investors, and 93% invite prospective institutional investors. Actual attendance varies by firm but typically ranges from 80-125 people in person with another 65-680 via webcast. The disclosure audience at broker-hosted conferences consists of the broker's institutional clients and broker's clients.
Hosting a major disclosure event with substantial informal and Q&A time is fraught with potential regulatory pitfalls. Other than IR, the two functional areas that are most likely to review the material are legal (87% of the time) and accounting (62%) (NIRI [2011] ). Management frequently rehearses their presentations and 78% of NIRI respondents specifically conduct Reg FD training or review prior to the event (NIRI [2011] ). The vast majority of firms publicly announce the event (primarily through press releases) and simultaneously webcast it to satisfy legal disclosure requirements. However, attendees have many opportunities for face-to-face informal interaction with management beyond the formal webcast presentation.
Disclosure is traditionally viewed as the prerogative of top management, but information relevant to understanding a company's activities and future prospects is also available to midlevel managers and operating personnel as well as key outsiders, suppliers and customers. For example, the head of R&D for a pharmaceutical company is likely to be better informed about the company's R&D activities than the CEO; the head of R&D for a pharmaceutical company would often present at the company's analyst/investor day (Menditto [2011] ). Moreover, analysts and portfolio managers view access to mid-level management and technical staff and sessions featuring a panel of customers and suppliers among the most desirable attributes of analyst/investor days (Rossi [2010] ). The involvement of a wide range of insiders and outsiders in the disclosure process distinguishes analyst/investor days from conference presentations and other disclosure media.
Companies stress the importance of informal time between management and attendees during the analyst/investor day (Sherman [2012] ): 62% of NIRI respondents offer opportunities for informal interactions between managers and investors and clients at lunches, dinners, and cocktail hours (NIRI [2011] Face-to-face interactions with analysts and investors take place during private meetings (Soltes [2014] ; Solomon and Soltes [2013] ) and site visits (Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang [2013] ), but these settings are less like analyst/investor days than conferences. In particular, private meetings are short duration, high frequency, small audience events that provide useful information to institutional investors (Solomon and Soltes [2013] ) and analysts (Soltes [2014] ).
Exploiting a recent Chinese regulation that mandates the reporting of site visits, Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang [2013] report that site visits have substantial information content and that they are offered by large, profitable, multi-segment firms, closely located to major economic centers.
However, their site visit setting represents more of an observational tour by analysts/investors as opposed to an active disclosure choice by the firm as face-to-face interaction with top executives rarely occurs during these visits. The incorporation of site visits into the Chinese regulatory disclosure framework and differences in the information and legal environments between the two countries raises questions about the generalizability of their institutional and systematic evidence. Finally, data on private meetings and site visits in the U.S. are not publicly available.
Our discussion of analyst/investor days' institutional attributes offers insights into their role as a disclosure medium. In particular, this medium should appeal to firms with high valuation uncertainty and complexity, as well as firms with a large institutional investor base.
The longer duration, more flexible format, and wider range of presenters are aptly suited to satisfy the disclosure needs of firms with diverse and complex activities. The co-location of the top management team and other key employees for a single day helps satisfy analysts' and investors' demand for face-to-face interactions with informed corporate insiders. Longer duration and flexible format are features conducive to the provision of large amounts of information. To the extent that firms take advantage of these features, disclosure made at analyst/investor days should be highly informative. We develop and test these ideas in Section 4.
Our comparative institutional analysis of analyst/investor days and conference presentations points toward potential interdependencies in the use and the information content of these mediums. Specifically, analyst/investor days may be hosted by both firms that lack opportunities for face-to-face interactions at conferences and firms that make conference presentations but whose information needs cannot be adequately met by a conference presentation's format. Further, if analyst/investor days and conference presentations compete for a limited corporate resource, e.g., the time and the attention of senior management, they are perhaps more likely to be scheduled in opposite quarters. Hypotheses about interdependencies in the use and information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations are developed and tested in Section 5.
Sample Formation and Description
We form a sample of analyst/investor days using Bloomberg Events to identify the date a company hosts an analyst/investor day over the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . We use the name, exchange, and ticker information on Bloomberg to match firms with the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) firm identifiers. Table 1 An alternative source of information about analyst/investor days is S&P Capital IQ. We find that Bloomberg Events is the more comprehensive database with 2,190 analyst/investor day events versus 1,461 in Capital IQ, with 943 of the events overlapping both databases. Bloomberg has 65% of the analyst/investor days included in Capital IQ while Capital IQ has only 44% of the analyst/investor days in Bloomberg. We use Bloomberg for our tabulated results to hold the database constant across our joint analysis of analyst/investor days with conference presentations. Our results in the paper are robust to using only the Capital IQ sample of analyst/investor days or a combined sample using both Capital IQ and Bloomberg to identify analyst/investor days.
5 If a firm hosts a multi-day analyst/investor day, we count this as one analyst/investor event with an event date of the earliest day. Overall, 94 out of 2,190 analyst/investor events in our sample were multi-day events. The sample decreases slightly across various analyses depending on data availability and the observation level of the analysis.
Analysis of Analyst/Investor Days
In order to understand the role of analyst/investor days as a disclosure medium, we examine management's choice to host an analyst/investor day (Section 4.1), and whether analyst/investor days are informative (Section 4.2).
4.1.THE CHOICE TO HOST ANALYST/INVESTOR DAYS
We draw from prior literature to identify a large set of disclosure determinants to help explain the choice to host an analyst/investor day (e.g., Tasker [1998]; Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner [1999] , Lang and Lundholm [2000] , Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] ).
Variables
We measure firm size by the natural log of the firm's market value of equity (Log Size) at the end of the prior fiscal year, institutional ownership as the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent 13f institutional ownership report before the end of the prior fiscal year, and analyst following as the log of one plus the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts (Log Analyst) for any horizon during the prior fiscal year. 6 We include a measure of professional investor relations (IR) using an indicator variable equal to one if the firm employs a member of the National Investor Relations Institute during the fiscal year (Kirk and Vincent [2014] ). Firms with professional IR have the dedicated resources to plan and conduct analyst/investor days, and are therefore more likely to host one. Including IR makes it more difficult to document the incremental effects of disclosure determinants since the choice to employ IR professionals is driven by similar factors that drive corporate disclosure (Kirk and Vincent [2014] ).
We include a measure of a firm's financing activities because disclosure incentives are generally stronger around security offerings, 7 and a measure of a firm's M&A activity because of anecdotal evidence that analysts and portfolio managers expect companies that grow through M&A to include a session devoted to discussing recent acquisitions (Rossi [2010] ). We capture financing and M&A activities using the SDC Database with an indicator variable (Financing) equal to one if the firm issued debt or equity during the prior, current, or subsequent fiscal year, and another indicator variable (M&A Activity) equal to one if the firm was engaged in M&A activity in the prior, current or subsequent fiscal year.
We include firm's age, the number of segments, high tech industry membership, R&D intensity, return volatility, and the market-to-book ratio because they capture different aspects of valuation uncertainty (Lang [1991] , Botosan [1997] , Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols [2001] ). We There is more valuation uncertainty about firms in high tech industries with relatively more intangible assets and R&D because their financial statements are relatively less informative, and because the value of these firms comes from future earnings growth and investments in new projects (Tasker [1998] , Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols [2001] , Green, Jame, Markov, and total assets at the end of the prior fiscal year, and R&D Intensity as R&D expense scaled by total operating expenses at the end of the prior fiscal year (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols [2001] ).
We measure the book-to-market ratio (Book-to-Market) at the end of the prior fiscal year, and return volatility by the standard deviation of daily returns over a year period ending at the prior fiscal year end (Std Dev of Returns).
Consistent with prior work, we also include prior stock return performance, leverage, and a loss indicator (Chen, DeFond, and Park [2002] , Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] ). Prior
Returns is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock return over a year period ending at the prior fiscal year end. We measure leverage (Leverage) at the end of the prior fiscal year as long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets. We measure losses (Loss) by an indicator variable that equals one if the prior fiscal year's net income before extraordinary items is negative.
Descriptive Statistics
From 2004 to 2011, 1,031 unique firms hosted 1,930 analyst/investor days and have the necessary data for investigating the firm's choice. Table 2 , Panel A, describes the characteristics of the analyst/investor day sample in the fiscal year prior to hosting the analyst/investor day compared with the CRSP/Compustat firms that did not host an analyst/investor day.
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On average, firms that host analyst/investor days are larger, have more institutional investor holdings, and more analyst following, and are more likely to have professional IRcharacteristics typically associated with a richer information environment. However, they also appear to operate in a more complex environment with more M&A activity, more segments, greater recognized intangibles, relatively more R&D expenses, and a lower book-to-market ratio -characteristics that suggest greater business uncertainty and more difficult-to-predict earnings and cash flows. Similarly, firms from high technology industries are more likely to host analyst/investor days. Overall, firms that host analyst/investor days appear markedly different from those that do not. 
Logit Model Results
We define an indicator variable, AIDAY, that equals one if the firm hosts an analyst/investor day during the year, and zero otherwise. We estimate the logistic model
where the matrix Xit contains i's characteristics measured in year t; and β is a vector of coefficients. We include year dummies to control for economic and regulatory changes. Second, the likelihood that a firm hosts an analyst/investor day is positively associated with the number of segments, M&A activity, intangible assets, R&D intensity, and negatively associated with firm age and book-to-market. This suggests that firms facing valuation difficulties are more likely to host analyst/investor days. These firms choose to supplement their financial statements and other disclosures with a richer face-to-face disclosure medium better suited to explaining the greater complexity and difficult-to-predict earnings and cash flows of their operations. Lastly, the positive association with financing suggests firms actively seek to reduce information asymmetries to improve terms of financing. 
4.2.INFORMATION CONTENT
The continued existence of analyst/investor days strongly suggests that investors and analysts obtain value-relevant information incremental to what they obtain elsewhere.
Furthermore, analyst/investor days have features that facilitate the disclosure of information such as long duration, discretionary nature, and the involvement of a wide range of insiders. The extent to which firms take advantage of these features is, however, an empirical question. For instance, it is possible that firms use analyst/investor days primarily as a public relations vehicle.
Firms rehash old disclosures, engage in corporate puffery, and provide value-relevant information only by happenstance. For example, Robert Sahadeven, Managing Director of IR for United Airlines emphasizes that United Airlines' focus is on getting to know the management team on a personal level and that they specifically avoid earnings guidance to instead focus on strategy: "we aren't unveiling anything really new at our investor day" (NIRI-Chicago [2007] ).
An analysis of the information content of analyst/investor days is critical to demonstrating their significance as a disclosure medium and a market source of information.
Information Content Tests: Research Design and Variables
We examine the information content of analyst/investor days using abnormal return volatility, abnormal trading volume, and abnormal analyst activity measures surrounding the event (Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner [1999] , Cready and Hurtt [2002] ; Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] ). We focus on a three-day trading window [-1, +1] around the analyst/investor day because some are multiple day events; in these cases, the first day is day 0. In this analysis, we exclude analyst/investor days in which the firm announced earnings within two trading days of the analyst/investor day.
Abnormal return volatility (ABS_MAR) is measured as the three-day absolute marketadjusted return less the mean three-day absolute market-adjusted returns in the estimation period, and divided by the standard deviation of the mean absolute market-adjusted returns in the estimation period. 11 Abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) is measured as three-day volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation period, and divided by the standard deviation of the mean three-day turnover in the estimation period.
Using analyst forecasts of all horizons (from the IBES detail file database), we measure abnormal analyst forecast activity (ABN_FCST) as the number of analyst earnings forecasts in the window (-1, +1), standardized by subtracting the variable's mean and dividing by the variable's standard deviation, both from the estimation period. We count multiple forecasts by the same analyst for the same firm on the same day as a single forecast.
Results
Panel A of Table 4 Mirroring the evidence for investors, we find a significant increase in analyst forecast activity around analyst/investor days. The mean ABN_FCST is unusually large at 0.146, 0.126, and 0.266 over the windows (-7, -5), (-4, -2), and (+2, +4), respectively, peaking at 0.764 over the window (-1, +1): a 141% increase over the normal activity in the estimation period. 12 These findings suggest that analyst/investor days have substantial information content for capital market participants -that is, they are not only a public relations event but also a major disclosure event.
We investigate whether analyst/investor days affect trading volume even after controlling for the increase in return volatility. According to Kim and Verrecchia [1997] , differences in how traders interpret information lead to trading even when there is no increase in return volatility.
Differences in how traders interpret analyst/investor days' disclosures are likely to be significant because these disclosures concern complex topics and technical issues and provide soft, contextual information. For example, the head of R&D activities for a pharmaceutical company is likely to present at analyst/investor days; he is generally less known to investors and more apt to makes disclosures that are uncertain and technical in nature.
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Additionally, we expect that analyst/investor days will have an effect on analyst forecast revision that is incremental to the event's effect on return volatility and market turnover as the extended real-time face-to-face interactions of analyst/investor days facilitate information processing. If corporate disclosure concerns future earnings, targets equity analysts, or is made in 12 In untabulated analysis, we explore the alternative explanation that the information content of analyst/investor days is solely due to firms' concurrent use of familiar disclosure media such as management forecasts and 8K-filings. There are 785 analyst/investor days that coincide within a day of a management forecast or 8K-filing, representing 41% of the sample analyzed in Table 4 . Excluding these observations does not change the statistical or the economic significance of the findings. 13 More recent trading models highlight gradual information flow and limited attention as factors driving trading. (Hong and Stein [2007] ). A disclosure may target a group of investors or be attended to by a group of investors, creating investor disagreement about the value of the stock between those who received/attended to the disclosure and those who did not.
a setting that facilitates its processing by analysts, analyst revision activities may be greater than what we generally observe when volatility and turnover increase.
14 We use the subset of (-1, +1) event window observations to estimate the following models:
We report the results from the estimations of equations (2) and (3) in Panels B and C of Table 4 .
We find strong evidence that analyst/investor days' disclosures influence trading volume (significant intercept of 0.38) even after controlling for the increase in abnormal return volatility during the event window (-1, +1), consistent with traders interpreting analyst/investor days' disclosures in different ways. Our result echoes prior studies' conclusion that differential interpretation of information is an important economic phenomenon (Kandel and Pearson [1995] , Bamber, Barron, Stober [1999] ).
We also find evidence of increased analyst forecast activity (intercept of 0.66) after controlling for the increase in return volatility and turnover. Analyst revision activity is related to return volatility but not to turnover, which means that non-informational trading has no incremental effect on analyst activity. In conclusion, analyst/investor days' are a major source of new information for the market, as well as for individual investors and analysts.
Joint Analysis of Analyst/Investor Days and Conference Presentations
The empirical analyses conducted so far provide evidence that analyst/investor days are an important disclosure medium with informational consequences for the capital market, and a 14 The effect of disclosure on analyst revision activities would also be incremental if prices change in the absence of new information. Analyst revision activities have been used to identify information-based price changes from noninformation based price changes (Savor [2012] Table 3 's binary disclosure choice model by considering a greater number of disclosure outcomes (Section 5.1). Second, for a sample of firms that make conference presentations and host an analyst/investor day in the same year, we investigate whether firms engage in these activities in the same or opposite quarters (Section 5.1), and whether the information content of a conference presentation (analyst/investor day) depends on whether it occurs close to an analyst/investor day (conference presentation) (Section 5.2).
CHOICE ANALYSIS
We model disclosure choice as a choice between four discrete alternatives: (1) do nothing, (2) only make conference presentations, (3) only host an analyst/investor day, or (4) do both. 15 If very few firms choose alternative (4) relative to alternative (3), then analyst/investor days can be viewed as a solution to the so called 'neglected firm' problem. Brokers are interested in connecting clients to firms if doing so increases net profits, which means that some firms, where client demand for corporate access is low, are not going to be invited to conferences, leaving analyst/investor days for these firms as the only viable alternative. 15 The approach naturally unifies and extends Section 3's analysis of the choice between (1) doing nothing and (2) hosting analyst/investor days, and prior literature's analysis of the choice between (1) doing nothing and (2) making a conference presentation (Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] , Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi [2014b] ).
There are two competing hypotheses for why the majority of firms would choose outcome (4) relative to outcome (2). Our primary hypothesis is that analyst/investor days offer a fundamentally different cost-benefit trade-off from broker conferences. Specifically, the long duration of an analyst/investor day, the mixed format, and the involvement of a wide range of company insiders allow hosts to expand upon complex topics and provide soft information in a way that a conference presentation does not allow. The prediction is that firms that host analyst/investor days are larger, have more segments and intangible assets, and are more likely to engage in M&A activity than firms that only make conference presentations. The second hypothesis is that differences in institutional attributes between the two disclosure media are unimportant, and that there are therefore no systematic differences between the two sets of firms.
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We estimate the multinomial logit model:
where j=1, 2, 3, or 4 represents the following disclosure outcome in year t: the firm neither hosted an analyst/investor day or made a conference presentation, (NONE), the firm only made a conference presentation (CONF ONLY), the firm only hosted an analyst/investor day (AIDAY ONLY), or the firm hosted an analyst/investor day and made a conference presentation (BOTH); includes company k's characteristics from the prior fiscal year. We set CONF ONLY as the base outcome, and report coefficients that describe the probability of choosing AIDAY ONLY, BOTH, and, for completeness, NONE over choosing CONF ONLY in Table 5 .
The majority of AIDAY observations, 1,444, fall in the BOTH category and the remaining 486 fall in the AIDAY ONLY category, inconsistent with the hypothesis that analyst/investor days are a medium primarily used by firms lacking opportunities for face-to-face interactions with analysts and investors. Table 5 , Column 3 shows that relative to CONF ONLY, firms that choose AIDAY ONLY are larger, consistent with analyst/investor days being a costlier disclosure medium; they have lower analyst following, which means they are less known to analysts and investors, and consequently, they have greater incentives to engage in activities that increase investor recognition.
17 Table 5 , Column 4 compares firms that choose BOTH to firms that choose CDAY ONLY to shed light on our primary hypothesis. We find firms that choose BOTH differ from those that choose CDAY ONLY in systematic ways, consistent with the institutional features of analyst/investor days offering a valued alternative medium for the firms in which conference presentations are inadequate. The firms that choose BOTH are bigger and more likely to have professional IR, consistent with analyst/investor days being a costly disclosure medium that requires extensive in-house coordination and planning. Second, they have greater institutional ownership and analyst following, perhaps because only firms with high enough visibility can garner a large enough audience to make the event worthwhile. 18 Finally, they have characteristics associated with greater complexity and valuation uncertainty: they are younger, more likely to engage in M&A, have more segments, intangibles, R&D intensity, and lower book-to-market. 17 If the base case in equation (4) is NONE, the results for AIDAY ONLY are similar to those reported in Table 3 . For example, the coefficient on Financing is positive for both AIDAY ONLY and CDAY ONLY. Thus, the negative coefficient on Financing for AIDAY ONLY in Table 5 does not indicate that external financing is not a consideration when hosting an analyst/investor day, but indicates that it is relatively less a consideration for analyst/investor days (AIDAY ONLY) versus conference presentations (CDAY ONLY). 18 To put it differently, investors mildly interested in several firms are more likely to attend conferences where these firms present than analyst/investor days hosted by these firms (at different times and different locations).
The majority of firms engaging in both analyst/investor days and conferences raises the question of interdependencies in the disclosure timing decisions. On one hand, they are likely to take place in the same fiscal quarter, if the role of analyst/investor days is to supplement and expand on conference disclosures -brief and limited due to conference's short duration and restrictive format -or in the same quarter if there are synergies in concentrating interactive disclosures. On the other hand, if these disclosure media disseminate mostly the same information to mostly the same audience, or if they compete for a limited resource such as the time and attention of senior management and IR professionals, they are likely to take place in opposite quarters.
We focus on a subsample of firm-years where the firm conducts an analyst/investor day and makes conference presentations in the same year. We estimate the logit model
where ( ) indicates the occurrence of an analyst/investor day (a conference presentation) for firm i in quarter t, and −1 and +1 indicate the occurrence of a conference presentation in the prior and in the next quarter, which may fall outside the current fiscal year. In a second specification of the same model, we define , −1 and +1 as the number of conference presentations in the current, the prior, and the next quarter, respectively. Table 6 reports a strong negative contemporaneous relation between hosting an analyst/investor day and making conference presentations. A slope coefficient of -0.25 in column (2) means the probability of hosting an analyst/investor is reduced by 22% when the firm makes a conference presentation in the same quarter. A slope coefficient of -0.14 means that when the number of conference presentation in the current quarter increases by one standard deviation, the probability of hosting an analyst/investor in the same quarter is reduced by 16%.
In sum, analyst/investor days are a distinct and valued disclosure medium that can help achieve diverse firm-specific goals. In one case, they are used by firms that lack opportunities to interact with analysts and investors at broker conferences. In another, they are used by firms that have these opportunities but that find the short duration and rigid format of a conference presentation an imperfect solution to their information problem. Firms that host an analyst/investor day and make a conference presentation in the same year are more likely to engage in these disclosure activities in different quarters, either because they require the use of a limited resource, management time, or because there is a substantial overlap in information disclosed during the same quarter at different venues.
INFORMATION CONTENT
We expect greater return volatility, trading volume, and analyst revision activity around analyst/investor days than conferences because analyst/investor days have unique attributes (long duration, flexible format, and the involvement of a large number of insiders as presenters) that make it easier for management to disclosure more information. We expect that analyst reactions to analyst/investor days will be stronger than analyst reactions to conference presentations at broker-hosted conferences as analyst/investor days are attended by all analysts and broker conferences only by the broker analyst-host. We begin by reporting means and medians of market and analyst reaction variables for the window (-1,+1) around a conference presentation (Table 7 , Panel A). Return volatility and turnover increase around conference days but less so than around analyst/investor days. For instance, the increase in ABS_MAR around conference days is 0.097 versus 0.479 around analyst/investor days (Panel A, Table 4 ). Analyst forecast activity does not appear to increase during broker conferences.
Next we contrast the information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations on a subset of firms that hosted an analyst/investor day and presented at a conference over the same period. We focus on this subset of firms to help benchmark the information content of analyst/investor days and preclude the alternative explanation that firms hosting analyst/investor days have a higher propensity to disclose information than firms making conference presentations. We should observe the same pattern of results only if our previous hypothesis holds: analyst/investor days have unique features that facilitate the disclosure of information relative to conference presentations. We focus on a sample of firm-years where the firm conducted at least one analyst/investor day and at least one conference presentation in the same year.
We observe that the mean effect of analyst/investor days on three-day abnormal absolute returns and turnover is approximately six and three times larger than the effect of conference presentations (Table 7 , Panel B). We observe the largest disparity in the information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations for the abnormal analyst activity metric, as we continue to find that conference presentations affect abnormal analyst activity substantially less than they affect absolute returns and trading turnover. We draw two conclusions on the basis of these findings. Having more flexible format and longer duration, analyst/investor days convey significantly more information to market participants than conference presentations. Since analyst/investor days are open to all analysts but conference presentation are open only to the analyst/host, analysts are especially active around analyst/investor days and inactive around conference presentations.
Finally, we investigate potential interaction effects in the information content between analyst/investor days and conference presentations: specifically, whether the information content of a conference presentation (analyst/investor day) depends on whether it occurs close to an analyst/investor day (conference presentation). A positive proximity effect would suggest that firms host analyst/investor days and make conference presentations over a short period of time when they have more information to disclose. A negative proximity effect would suggest that analyst/investor days and conference presentations can be viewed as alternate disclosure channels. If the information content of a conference presentation is reduced by proximity to an analyst/investor day, but the information content of an analyst/investor day is unaffected by proximity to a conference presentation, then firms favor analyst/investor day as a disclosure channel over broker conferences.
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Panel A, Table 8 focuses on a sample of conference presentations that take place within 180 days of an analyst/investor day. We regress the market reaction to a conference presentation, defined as ABS_SAR or ABN_TURN, on AIDAY [-5, -30] and AIDAY [+5, +30] , indicating whether an analyst/investor day takes place before a conference presentation and whether it takes place after a conference presentation. 20 We find some evidence that when analyst/investor days precede conference presentations, conference presentations have a smaller effect on absolute returns, as evidenced by a slope coefficient of -0.12. Moreover, the mean information content of these conference presentations is completely eroded, given by the sum of 0.10, intercept, 19 Investors attend analyst/investor days to learn about a single firm and conferences to learn about a large number of firms (on average 60-80 presentations). Thus, the penalties for making boilerplate or redundant disclosures at analyst/investor days may be greater than the penalties for making boilerplate or redundant disclosures at conferences, in which case firms would have particularly strong incentives to make informative disclosures during analyst/investor days. 20 We find similar results when we either vary the sample window to focus on conference presentations that take place within 90 and 60 days of an analyst/investor days, or vary the AIDAY proximity measures to be 5-15 days or 5-45 days relative to the conference presentation.
and -0.12, slope coefficient. Surprisingly, the trading volume reaction to conference presentations is unaffected by proximity to analyst/investor days.
Panel B, Table 8 focuses on a sample of analyst/investor days that take place within 180 days of a conference presentation. Proximity to a conference presentation does not appear to affect the information content of analyst/investor days in terms of either abnormal return volatility or trading volume. The asymmetry in the abnormal return volatility findingsproximity to an analyst/investor negatively affects the price impact of analyst/investor days but not vice versa -is consistent with firms favoring analyst/investor days as a disclosure medium over conference presentations.
Conclusion
Reflecting the increased importance of face-to-face interactions with analysts and investors, several academic studies investigate the role of conference presentations as a disclosure medium and a source of information (e.g., Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] , Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi [2014b]). 21 However, the diversity of disclosure media that allow for face-to-face interactions and the implications for disclosure choice and capital market consequences have largely remained unexamined. Our investigation of analyst/investor days fills this gap in the literature.
Institutionally, analyst/investor days are similar to conference presentations in that they allow for face-to-face interactions with analysts/investors, but different in that the firm organizes and controls key aspects of these interactions, resulting in a longer duration, more flexible format, and a wider range of presenters. We draw several conclusions from our evidence. First, analyst/investor days are a major source of information for both analysts and investors, with event-day information effects three to six time larger than the effects of conference presentations.
Second, their distinctive institutional features make them a valued disclosure venue for firms with large analyst following, institutional ownership, and complex and diverse activities. As a result, while analyst/investor days are hosted by firms that lack opportunities for face-to-face reaction at conferences, the majority are hosted by firms that make conferences presentations but whose information needs cannot be adequately met by a conference presentation's short duration and rigid format. Third, there are interaction effects in the timing and the information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations. Analyst/investor days and conference presentations tend to occur in opposite quarters, which suggests an overlap in disclosure audience or information disclosed, or that these events compete for the time and attention of senior management and internal IR professionals. Analyst/investor days diminish the price impact of conference presentations but not vice versa, consistent with firms favoring analyst/investor days as a disclosure medium.
Our study has broader implications. Some recent research has suggested that firms no longer complete and innovate with their financial reporting practices for better access to capital markets (e.g., Dichev, Graham, and Rajgopal [2014] and Zimmermann [2013] ), which raises the question of how then firms compete for better access to capital markets? 22 The professionalized 22 Dichev, Graham, and Rajgopal [2014] conclude CFOs ''view financial reporting largely as a compliance activity rather than as a vehicle of innovation designed to inform stakeholders and lower the cost of capital. '' Zimmermann [2013] argues that the GAAP, SEC, and exchange listing reporting rules and regulations, and auditing by independent accountants impose a high level of financial reporting quality, and that the magnitude of the marginal benefit to managerial effort to enhance reporting quality is rather small.
role of IR and the increased prevalence and information content of analyst/investor days and conference presentations is consistent with firms competing for better access to capital markets by identifying and targeting influential market participants, offering opportunities for face-toface interactions, and engaging key company employees and third parties in the disclosure process.
Although we study the choice to communicate information at analyst/investor days and/or conferences, firms can also communicate information to small groups of professional investors and analysts during private meetings and site visits (Soltes [2014] , Solomon and Soltes [2013] ; Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang [2013] ) and to a wide audience skewed toward individual investors using social media (Blackenspoor, Miller, and White [2014] ; Jung, Naughton, Tahoun, and Wang [2014] ). As knowledge about the diversity of disclosure media accumulates, the question of how companies choose a particular mix of disclosure media assumes new significance. We view the development of disclosure theories that incorporate the existence of alternative disclosure media that target different audiences in different ways as a fruitful and important area of research. Day sample consists of firm-years with the necessary data from the CRSP/Compustat database but without hosting an analyst/investor day from our sample. The unit of observation is firm-fiscal year. Size is the firm's market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. Investor Relations is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm employs a member of the National Investor Relations Institute during the year. Institutional Holdings is the percentage of institutional holdings based on the most recent report issued prior to the end of the fiscal year. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for any horizon during the fiscal year. We assume that analyst coverage and institutional ownership are zero for any period when the company is listed on an exchange but no data are available on analyst coverage (IBES) and institutional holdings (13f). Financing (M&A Activity) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues debt or equity (engages in M&A Activity) in the prior, current, or subsequent fiscal year as reported in the SDC Database. Age is the number of years since first listed on CRSP. Segments is the number of unique business segments for the company listed in its annual filings from Compustat. We assume Segments is one if it is missing. High Tech is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm belongs to one of the following SIC codes: 2833-2836 (drugs), 8731-8734 (R&D services), 7371-7379 (programming), 3570-3577 (computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), or 3810-3845 (precise measurement instruments). Intangibles are recognized intangibles plus goodwill scaled by total assets. R&D Intensity is research and development expense divided by total operating expenses. Book-to-Market is the book-to-market. Std Dev of Returns is the standard deviation of daily returns. Prior Returns is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock return. Prior Returns and Std Dev of Returns are all calculated over the year prior to the fiscal year end and we require at least 50 days of trading data over the year. Leverage is long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets. Loss is an indicator variable equal to one if the net income before extraordinary items is negative. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers. The logit model examines the decision to host an analyst/investor day from 2004 to 2011 using all CRSP/Compustat firms with the necessary data. We define the choice variable, AIDAY, as an indicator variable equal to one if a firm hosts an analyst/investor day during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Over that period, 1,031 firms hosted investor days (over 1,930 firm-years) and have the necessary data for the regression model. The unit of observation is firm-fiscal year. Independent variables are measured the fiscal year prior to the one in which the decision is made to host an analyst/investor day. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . %STDX is the percentage change in the odds of hosting an analyst/investor day for a standard deviation increase in the independent variable (from the mean). The p-values, in parentheses, are two-way and based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. This table provides means and medians of stock market and analyst forecast reaction variables during three-day windows around an analyst/investor day. Day 0 is the event day. The absolute value of market-adjusted returns (ABS_MAR) is the three-day absolute market-adjusted returns less the mean three-day absolute market-adjusted returns from the estimation period (-120,-30) , divided by the standard deviation of the mean absolute market-adjusted returns from the same estimation period. Abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) is the three-day volume divided by shares outstanding, similarly standardized. Market-adjusted returns are based on the CRSP value-weighted market index. Abnormal forecast reaction (ABN_FCST) is the three-day number of analyst earnings forecasts issued in an event window standardized by subtracting the estimation period's mean and dividing by the estimation period's standard deviation. The estimation period is (-120,-30) . Panels B and C use only observations in the window (-1, +1) to estimate the listed OLS regressions. *** The table presents a multinomial logit regression from 2004 to 2011 where the base case is the firm only presents at a conference presentation during the year. The dependent variable, AIDAY_CONF, equals 1 for firm-years where the firm neither hosted an analyst/investor day nor presented at a broker-hosted conference (NONE, n=21,519); equals 2 for firm-years where the firm only presented at a conference (CONF ONLY, n=14,320); equals 3 for firm-years where the firm only hosted an analyst/investor day (AIDAY ONLY, n=486); and equals 4 for firm-years where the firm presented at a conference and hosted an analyst/investor day (BOTH, n=1, 444) . Variables are from the fiscal year prior to hosting the analyst/investor day or presenting at the conference. The unit of observation is firm-fiscal year. Variables are defined in Table 2. *** This table presents an analysis of a subsample of fiscal years where a firm both hosts an analyst investor day and makes at least one conference presentation. It shows the results from estimating the logit model listed above where the unit of observation is firm-quarter. AIDAY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm hosts an analyst/investor day during that fiscal quarter. CONFt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm presents as a conference during that fiscal quarter CONFt-1 (CONFt+1) are indicator variables equal to 1 if a firm presents at a conference in the fiscal quarter prior to (subsequent to) the current quarter, including the quarter outside the current fiscal year. NUM_CONFt, NUM_CONFt-1, and NUM_CONFt+1 are similarly defined with the CONF variables but based on the number of conference presentations within the fiscal quarter. *** , **
, and * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, using a two-tailed test. The p-values, in parentheses, are two-way and based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. This table extends Table 4 to compare the information content of analyst/investor days to that of conference presentations. Panel A reports means and medians of market and analyst reaction variables for the window (-1,+1) around a conference presentation. Panel B shows the difference in stock market and analyst reactions across analyst/investor days and conference presentations using a subset of firm-years with both an analyst/investor day and a conference presentation. Variables are defined in Table 4 . *** , ** , and * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, using a two-tailed test (means) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (medians). † † †, † †, and † denote a significant difference in means at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of the stock market and analyst reactions between the analyst/investor days and conference presentations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. This table examines the interaction of information content between analyst/investor days and conference presentations. Panel A uses a subsample of conference presentations that were within 180 days of an analyst/investor day. The indicator variables AIDAY [-5, -30] and AIDAY [+5, +30] indicate an analyst/investor day was held in the month before and after the conference presentation. Panel B uses a subsample of analyst/investor days that were within 180 days of a conference presentation. The indicator variables CONF [-5, -30 ] CONF [+5, +30] indicate a conference presentation was held in the month before and after the analyst/investor day. *** , ** , and * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, using a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
